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1. Introduction 
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented social distancing measures around the 
world to contain the spread of the virus. The UK has, like many countries, effectively closed 
down entire sectors of its economy and severely limited activity in many other sectors. 
This curtailing of activity is likely to lead to a sharp recession. At the same time, the risks of 
easing these measures too soon, or in misguided ways, are obvious, not only for public 
health but also for the economy. A world with no lockdown and a pandemic spreading 
rapidly through the population does not make for a healthy economy either; nor, in all 
likelihood, does a world in which containment measures have to be repeatedly reinstated 
after being eased prematurely or in suboptimal ways. 
The government faces these incredibly difficult trade-offs in deciding when and how to 
ease lockdown restrictions to restart the economy. It will have to take these decisions with 
limited knowledge of what is happening to firms, families and workers, what the health 
and economic consequences of alternative policies will be, and considerable uncertainty 
about how events will unfold and how best to promote inclusive economic recovery.  
In this note, we discuss some key economic issues that should be considered when 
thinking about how best to get people back into work: we assemble some basic empirical 
evidence, identify some challenges that policymakers will need to confront, and discuss 
some policy considerations. Many of the specific issues that we overview could be 
examined in more detail, and we hope that this paper might make some contribution in 
setting the agenda for that.  
When thinking about this highly unusual crisis, there are a few insights from economics 
that can be helpful in guiding policy thinking in relation to easing the lockdown and 
getting people back into work. These underlie a number of the more specific policy 
options that we discuss later, and it is useful to describe them up front. 
The first is that pervasive economic uncertainty in itself typically dampens economic 
activity, and additional policy uncertainty can be particularly damaging. On some 
measures, economic uncertainty is now greater in magnitude than during the 2008 
financial crisis (Baker et al., 2020). Restarting the economy while mitigating the rate of 
virus transmission will require firms to reorganise working and workplace arrangements, 
which will often involve costly investments. Many workers too may need to invest in new 
skills, and perhaps even relocate, in order to continue working. Neither firms nor workers 
will take these steps as much as would be ideal if it is unclear for how long those 
investments will be needed.  
In other contexts, uncertainty – and policy uncertainty in particular – has been shown to 
discourage firms from taking action and from investing (e.g. Pindyck (1991), Bloom et al. 
(2007) and Baker et al. (2016)). Of course, flexibility and discretion over future policy is 
necessary in a situation where much of the relevant science remains unknown, as is 
currently the case – and claiming certainty now only to change guidance later would 
probably undermine certainty more than simply saying nothing. But there may be things 
on which basic ‘forward guidance’ can already be provided. For example, it seems safe to 
say that the desk-based economy will be expected to largely work from home, and that 
many workplaces will be expected to implement social distancing measures, for some 
time after the full lockdown is eased. Being clear about that now will help ensure that 
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firms do not underinvest in making these things happen effectively, under the mistaken 
impression that things might soon return to normal for them once lockdown is eased. The 
damaging effects of uncertainty – particularly where this cannot be easily removed by 
government, given the inevitably uncertain environment – also highlight the importance 
of effective state insurance schemes, so that firms and workers do not bear all of the risks 
of further disruptions or lockdowns.  
Second, the need for innovation will be a central feature of the post-lockdown, pre-vaccine 
period. Successfully navigating trade-offs between economic activity and rates of virus 
transmission will require adaptations to the ways in which work is organised, to reduce 
crowding in the workplace (both by enabling working from home and by increasing social 
distancing within the workplace) and on public transport as people commute. The 
appropriate innovations will tend to be different in different sectors and contexts, and it is 
industry – rather than government – that will be best placed to identify them. But there 
are crucial things that government can do to encourage and facilitate this type of 
innovation. Providing certainty where possible is one important example, as discussed. As 
with innovation in other areas, regulation, monitoring, and the sharing or publicising of 
best practice are all policies that potentially can encourage it. Fiscal policy instruments 
might also play a role to align firms’ incentives with society’s wider interests: the presence 
of a contagious virus creates obvious externalities meaning, for example, that many of the 
gains from innovations to enable workers to work from home will be felt by the rest of 
society (in the form of lower rates of virus transmission) rather than by those workers or 
firms themselves. There are also subtler reasons why firms’ investments may fall short of 
what is socially optimal. Returns to the investments of one firm depend on similar 
investments being made by firms in its supply chain and by other businesses that 
purchase its output, so that they too can reopen normal activity. Here there is a useful 
analogy with the economics of climate change, where strategic complementarities mean 
that individual firms underinvest in adaptations towards cleaner energy, even in the 
presence of a carbon tax (Aghion et al., 2014). This market failure could be tackled through 
a combination of targeted subsidies, insurance schemes that reduce investment risk, and 
regulation establishing, for instance, minimum distance requirements in the workplace. 
Third, there is an unusually strong case for the government to play an active role in 
helping the labour market adjust to the huge shock that it has gone through. The severity 
of this crisis, combined with the fast adoption of new technologies to facilitate social 
distancing in work, is already leaving many workers without a job as their firms shut down 
or their occupations become redundant; in all likelihood, more will follow. Other workers 
are being temporarily furloughed while their firms are in lockdown. Millions of workers 
may need to look for different sorts of work, in different firms and different sectors, either 
temporarily or permanently. In any given local labour market, there is no guarantee that 
the skill sets of workers looking for new jobs will match the new needs of firms, and – 
particularly in markets with lots of small firms – the logistical exercise in forming matches 
between large numbers of workers and firms can be slow and inefficient, as we have seen 
in the example of fruit pickers. More generally, we know that large mismatches in the 
labour market can hamper employment and economic growth (Sahin et al., 2014). To 
minimise such negative and long-lasting effects, there is a strong case for public 
intervention – not of the command-and-control type, but to minimise the frictions in the 
labour market by, for instance, providing platforms for job posting and matching in 
specific sectors or occupations. Policies to incentivise retraining on the job may also 
facilitate the formation of new high-quality matches. And there should be firm steps to 
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remove obvious barriers to sensible labour market reallocation, such as exclusivity clauses 
which prevent some furloughed workers from taking up temporary work in sectors where 
there is demand for their labour. In some localities where private sector vacancies are 
poorly matched to the skill sets of unemployed or furloughed workers, there may be a 
case for more direct intervention – for example, by employing such workers to conduct 
valuable public investments that will pay off later. All of this will require good data (better 
than are currently available) on where vacancies are arising and the locations and 
characteristics of the furloughed and unemployed. 
Fourth, the impacts of lifting the lockdown will depend on how individuals respond to the 
new rules. Individuals and families face very variable constraints and incentives to go back 
to work. Many workers will be incapable of returning to work, either because they have 
health vulnerabilities or because they live with vulnerable people or key workers. In 
addition, while schools and nurseries remain closed, many parents will find it difficult to 
return to work and support their children. We estimate that, among non-key workers who 
cannot easily work from home, two-thirds could have constraints that limit their 
participation in the labour market or have circumstances such that the risks of their 
participation are relatively high. Any strategy for easing lockdown that is based on letting 
some population groups go back to the workplace before others should be prepared for 
the fact that there will still be many difficult cases within those groups, and the need to 
ensure safety on public transport and in the workplace will still be paramount. 
Another running theme is that the most appropriate policy in each case depends on the 
balance of information and know-how between the government and other economic 
agents. Where firms or workers have better information than government, policy should 
be designed to encourage them to take the best actions – for instance, through 
regulation, subsidies, or the (possibly temporary) removal of existing regulation, taxes or 
subsidies that provide disincentives. Where government has better information, it should 
be more directional.  
Some caveats are in order before we proceed. First, there are important limitations to 
what we can say empirically now, as most of the information we have is from the pre-crisis 
period. The real-time data that already exist are limited and we comment on where we 
think this is a particularly important concern.  
Second, we do not consider what tolerance society may have for infection risk and 
whether that changes as the crisis unfolds. These are clearly key inputs to decision-
making, which we are not best placed to comment on. Tolerance to the risk of getting 
infected is likely to vary across individuals.  
Third, there are important behavioural factors that we again are not well placed to 
comment on here. As the lockdown is eased, some individuals may behave more 
carelessly, possibly speeding up contagion and making the outside environment riskier for 
all and especially for the most vulnerable. Conversely, under continued strict restrictions, 
some may increasingly flout them. These should be important considerations when 
assessing different policies.  
Fourth, scientific or practical advances, such as widespread testing or the rapid 
development and deployment of medical treatment, would have important consequences 
   
© Institute for Fiscal Studies  5 
for how one views alternative policy avenues. A discussion of the economic policy 
implications of such developments is outside the scope of this paper. 
In Section 2, we set the context with what we know about who is and is not working under 
lockdown. In Sections 3–6, we run through some of the key factors that we need to think 
about in order to restart the economy, covering working from home, commuting, safety in 
the workplace, and individual- or household-level constraints or risks to going out to work. 
In each section, we set out some key empirical facts and discuss the role for government, 
with reference to some of the key principles outlined above. In Section 7, we discuss which 
firms will want or be able to employ workers as we restart and issues around supply 
chains and productivity. In Section 8, we summarise and conclude.  
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2. Who is and is not working under 
lockdown  
To set the scene for much of what is to come, it is useful to set out what we know about 
who is, and is not, working under the current lockdown. Figure 1 shows the percentage of 
workers who have been furloughed in different industries, among businesses that 
responded to a survey conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) between 23 
March and 5 April this year.1 The survey is intended to cover firms that either continue to 
trade or have temporarily paused trading, not firms that have shut down completely 
(hence, it is possible that the 0.3% of firms that had ceased trading is a substantial 
underestimate of the true figure across the UK). These figures also do not include the self-
employed or unincorporated businesses. More generally, there is no guarantee of 
representativeness. But it is perhaps the best information we have at present.  
Figure 1 suggests that in late March and early April, 27% of employees had been 
furloughed. Furlough rates were greatest for businesses in the accommodation and food 
services sector and the arts, entertainment and recreation sector, which respectively 
furloughed 80% and 68% of their workers. The same survey indicates that 0.5% of 
employees had been made redundant over this period (again, note that this may exclude 
significant numbers of employees who are now without work because their firms have 
folded altogether).  
Figure 1. Share of workers furloughed by businesses responding to ONS survey, 23 
March to 5 April 2020 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2020. 
 
 
1  The survey asks firms what proportion of their workforce they have furloughed and these figures are then 
weighted according to firm employment data taken from the Inter-Departmental Business Register. 6,150 
businesses responded to the survey. 
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Figure 2. Share of workers in shut-down sectors by age group and gender 
 
Source: Joyce and Xu (2020), based on Quarterly Labour Force Survey 2019. 
Another approach to estimating the number of workers who have been furloughed or laid 
off is to survey individuals. Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) report the first available results from 
an online survey of 3,974 individuals taken on 25 March 2020. Their figures suggest much 
greater proportions of individuals no longer working, but largely corroborates the kinds of 
variations seen across sectors shown in Figure 1, and provides additional detail 
suggesting that younger workers and women are more likely to have lost work. This 
accords with ex-ante analysis of pre-crisis data by Joyce and Xu (2020), which shows that 
sectors that have been entirely shut down – such as hospitality – disproportionately 
employ those groups (see Figure 2).  
The fact that the Adams-Prassl et al. survey includes the self-employed and people whose 
firms have gone bust would be one potential reason for the gloomier picture it paints 
when compared with the ONS survey, though it is also likely that surveys of this kind 
undersample people who still have plenty of work to do and hence less time to fill in 
surveys. Clearly, more real-time data will help. But, taken together, what these useful and 
timely analyses do reveal very clearly is that large fractions of the workforce are not 
currently doing productive work and that this varies greatly across sectors and hence 
types of people. 
These figures are crucial context to the challenge of easing lockdown. They provide a 
sense of scale for how far out of equilibrium the labour market will be as restrictions are 
eased, with huge numbers of people and firms looking to restart work and production at 
around the same time. As we discuss later, the potential role for government to help 
smooth this huge exercise in coordination and reallocation is unusually significant, as it 
could otherwise take a very long time and lead in the interim to inefficient labour markets 
– for example, unnecessary labour shortages in some sectors, as we have seen recently 
for fruit pickers – and needless hardship for unemployed workers. More specifically, one 
may look at some of these figures and discern with fairly high probability that a number of 
the furloughed or laid-off workers will not be able to return to their previous work for 
some time – for example, many of those furloughed in the accommodation and food 
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services sector. It should be a priority to identify now where those workers are, and to 
ease barriers to them taking up alternative work, at least on a temporary basis, rather 
than simply accept that they will be furloughed and not doing productive work for many 
months. Moreover, this sector has space and other capital that are currently not being 
used. Repurposing such space for alternative uses that will be more compatible with social 
distancing as the lockdown is eased could maximise its value and allow more workers to 
restart their activities.  
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3. Working from home 
As lockdown is eased, ensuring that those who could work from home reasonably 
productively are doing so should be a policy priority. It dampens the trade-off between 
the level of economic activity and the rate of virus transmission. It benefits not only those 
who can work from home; it also enables more of those who cannot work from home to 
go to work, without society once again seeing a spike in virus infections large enough to 
precipitate the reintroduction of lockdown which would once again threaten their 
livelihoods. But there is obvious potential for market failure here resulting in insufficient 
working from home. Some of the benefits from doing so accrue not to the individuals or 
firms themselves but to others in society (through lower virus transmission); and working 
from home may require investments and adaptations that the uncertain environment 
could inhibit. 
Ability to work from home 
Figure 3 shows occupation-level estimates of the degree to which workers might be able 
to work from home, against average earnings in that occupation. To produce this, we have 
applied the approach of Avdiu and Nayyar (2020), which was based on the tasks involved 
in different occupations in the US (which itself utilised analysis of the O*NET task database 
undertaken by Dingel and Neiman (2020)). Each occupation at the four-digit level of the 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC 2010, ONS) is classified as either amenable or 
not amenable to home working. For example, jobs that necessarily involve working with 
machinery, close contacts with customers or working outside will not be amenable to 
home working, all else equal. On the other hand, many desk-based occupations such as 
legal work, management and computer programming (shown towards the top of the 
graph) will be. There are two caveats to Figure 3. First, it is based on pre-crisis information 
on task content. This is not immutable, and the nature of some roles could be adapted (as 
discussed further below). Second, it assumes that the US-based classification of 
occupations by task content translates perfectly to the UK setting. 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of occupations that can be worked from home within each 
two-digit-level SOC-2010 group against the average pay in that group of occupations. It 
demonstrates that lower-paid jobs are less likely to be amenable to doing from home. This 
emphasises the likely need for effective insurance from government for some time, to 
help those who cannot be accommodated safely in the workplace. Figure 4 splits the 
analysis instead by region and shows that the occupations of workers in London are on 
average considerably more amenable to home working than those in the rest of the 
country. For example, 58% of workers in London are in occupations amenable to home 
working compared with 38% in the North East of England. (Magrini (2020) provides 
information on the possibility of working from home at a more granular level.) This is 
actually a convenient fact in the context of mitigating virus transmission since, as we shall 
see, if Londoners do not work from home they are much more likely than others to 
commute by public transport, in which the risk of spreading the virus is relatively high. An 
emphasis on ensuring that home working happens wherever it can looks particularly 
appropriate in London. 
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Figure 3. Amenability of different occupations to home-based work against average 
earnings for different occupations 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey data for 2018–19. ‘Can work from home’ assessed on O*NET characteristics of jobs, 
including whether works outdoor every day, deals with safety equipment, machinery, deals with public, etc. 
Vertical axis measures the proportion of occupations that can be worked from home within each two-digit-level 
SOC-2010 group. 
Figure 4. Share of workers in occupations that could be done at home by region 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Quarterly Labour Force Survey 2019 and measures of whether occupations 
can be worked from home taken from Dingel and Neiman (2020). Calculations based on region of residence.  
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Ensuring that working from home happens as much as it should 
The possibility of working at home given the tasks involved in one’s job pre-crisis is not 
necessarily a good guide to whether one could do one’s job from home after sufficient 
ingenuity and innovation to reorganise working practices or service delivery. Adaptation is 
possible. In the education sector, working from home was not the norm prior to the crisis, 
but universities were able to make the shift towards remote teaching relatively quickly and 
easily. Similarly, school teachers have to some extent been able to use existing technology 
to enable them to work from home, although potentially with diminished quality. 
There may be longer-term benefits from innovations of this kind. In some industries, and 
at least when it is partly the worker’s choice, working from home has been shown to 
improve productivity significantly (Bloom et al., 2015). In other contexts too, ‘forced 
experimentation’ of methods that would not otherwise have been tried has led to people 
discovering that they were not previously doing things optimally: namely, the 2014 
London Tube strikes led to permanent changes in commuting behaviour as people were 
forced to discover commuting routes or methods that they preferred to what they were 
doing before (Larcom et al., 2017). It is certainly possible that this crisis does something 
similar for remote working as, for example, people re-evaluate the need to travel rather 
than use videoconferencing facilities.  
However, the most basic case for policy action to encourage working from home is much 
simpler. There are negative externalities associated with travel and social contact in the 
workplace during a pandemic. Hence, there is a clear potential role for government in 
encouraging working from home and the innovations that facilitate it. And an uncertain 
environment may prevent firms from making the investments that are required, so there 
is a role for government in mitigating that uncertainty. 
Potential policy levers include: 
 ‘Forward guidance’ about the expectation of working from home in certain parts 
of the economy. Despite all the uncertainties ahead, it seems highly likely that under 
any sensible and balanced approach to lifting lockdown, many people in desk-based 
occupations should be continuing to work from home for some time. Making this clear 
now could have real benefits. Company decision-makers who think they will be filling 
offices again as soon as lockdown is lifted are unlikely to be investing as much as they 
should be in innovation to enable productive working in a remote context. 
 Loans or grants to cover the up-front investment costs in remote working 
technologies, perhaps targeted at smaller businesses where cash-flow issues are likely 
to be most significant. (Ideally, there would be monitoring to ensure that working from 
home is actually taking place for recipients of these – see below for wider benefits of 
monitoring.) 
 Sharing of best practice. Firms and sectors will tend to be best at figuring out how to 
most effectively conduct remote working in their particular context. But the 
government could play a role in helping new innovations and best practices to spread 
as quickly as possible. 
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 Subsidies for firms or workers who are operating from home. The theoretical case 
for these is clear, given the externalities, though the practical design could be 
challenging – for example, to avoid large deadweight.  
 Norm setting. Simply sending a strong signal that certain sectors or occupations are 
expected to work from home, and that failing to do so is deemed unacceptable and 
irresponsible, may have a significant effect. The government could play its part in 
making it reputationally or psychologically costly to flout this societal expectation, 
effectively internalising the externality without the cost or design challenges of a 
financial subsidy to working from home. 
 Regulation and monitoring. As well as the direct benefits, this can help spur 
innovation in working from home. 
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4. Commuting 
The crisis has turned normal assessments of the social desirability of different forms of 
transport on their head. The externality calculus normally favours public transport. Now, 
travel on crowded public transport – particularly at peak times – comes with obvious 
negative externalities, given the risk of spreading illness. Travel by car is better for 
containing the spread of the virus, and is also associated with lower-than-normal 
congestion externalities as road use has fallen, though the costs of the pollution it causes 
may be higher than normal due to the respiratory problems associated with COVID-19. 
Perhaps the clearest example of a mode of commuting that has become more desirable 
as a result of the virus is cycling. The broader point is that the social costs and benefits of 
different forms of commuting have changed, and this calls for temporary changes in 
policy.  
Some simple empirical facts help to highlight the challenges that need addressing. First, 
there are large regional differences in commuting patterns. It is in London that 
commuting by public transport is by far the biggest issue. Figure 5 shows that 49% of 
workers resident in the capital commuted to work via public transport before the crisis, 
compared with around 9% of workers living in the rest of the UK. Journeys in London also 
frequently involve several forms of transport – for example, changing lines on the London 
Underground; this can heighten infection risks, particularly at crowded times (Goscé and 
Johansson, 2018). 
Figure 5. Means of getting to work in London and in the rest of the country 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using UK Household Longitudinal Survey (wave 8). ‘Public transport’ includes those 
who travel by bus/coach, train or metro/underground/tram/light railway. ‘Other’ includes those who travel by 
motorbike or taxi, as well as those who usually work from home so do not commute. Calculations based on 
region of residence. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Car Public transport Walk/cycle Other
Sh
ar
e 
of
 w
or
ke
rs
 (%
)
Outside London In London
  
14  © Institute for Fiscal Studies 
Figure 6. Share of those who normally commute to work via public transport who 
work in occupations that are amenable to home working 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Quarterly Labour Force Survey 2019, UK Household Longitudinal Survey 
(wave 8) and measures of whether occupations can be worked from home taken from Dingel and Neiman (2020), 
averaged at the three-digit-level occupation. Calculations based on region of residence.  
Figure 7. Share of workers travelling to work in 10-minute intervals over the course 
of a weekday  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using UK Time Use Survey 2014–15. Graph shows the share of workers who report 
their main activity in a 10-minute interval as commuting. Data are for a randomly selected weekday.  
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On the other hand, and fortunately given Figure 5, London residents are also 
disproportionately likely to work in occupations amenable to home working. Figure 6 
shows the proportion of those taking public transport to work who could potentially work 
from home. Almost two-thirds of London residents who used to rely on public transport 
could work from home. Hence, one way of addressing the challenge caused by hazardous 
commuting is to pay particular attention to the policy levers encouraging working from 
home (discussed in the previous section) in London. 
Second, there is very substantial clustering of commuting at peak times. Achieving greater 
dispersion of commute times is one way to reduce the public health consequences of a 
given amount of commuting (and may well be complementary to other measures, such as 
trying to enforce minimum distances between people on public transport). Figure 7 shows 
that commuting, especially in London and the South East, clusters heavily around peak 
times. At 8:30am, 20% of workers in London and the South East are commuting. Flattening 
these peaks – both by reducing absolute demand for public transport and by shifting 
demand into less busy times of the day – would reduce the risk of infection.  
One way of flattening these peaks would be to encourage firms to be innovative in how 
they structure working hours and shifts, to enable workers to spread their commutes 
more throughout the day. This could be achieved by shifting working hours on a firm-by-
firm basis but, where possible, it will be preferable for firms to achieve this by enabling 
workers within the firm to start at different times. This not only reduces the need for 
coordination between firms (which the government would be well placed to help with, if 
necessary); it also reduces contact between workers within the workplace. It is therefore 
discussed further in the next section. 
Finally, given the temporary change in the externality calculus of different modes of 
commuting, the government could alter the relative prices of different types of commutes 
to better reflect this new reality. Examples would be to reduce the relative price of 
commuting at off-peak times on the London Tube and bus network, or further measures 
to financially incentivise cycling. The government should, however, be mindful of the 
political economy of reversing temporary policies when they are no longer optimal. For 
example, if on balance it were judged that the relative social desirability of driving relative 
to public transport use had temporarily increased, we would still be hesitant to 
recommend temporary cuts in fuel duties, given that recent history suggests the 
government would find it very difficult to increase fuel duties again in the face of 
inevitable lobbying post-crisis.  
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5. Making work safer 
Ability to socially isolate at work 
Social contact in the workplace – whether with customers or colleagues – will be another 
important dimension of risk when easing lockdown restrictions. The UK government has 
been consulting unions, large firms and business groups on the ease of social distancing 
in different types of workplaces – for example, outdoor work or work in another person’s 
home. Assessing social distancing risk by workplace has the advantage that it is likely 
relatively easy for businesses and workers to self-assess which category they belong to. 
However, this is likely to be a crude tool. For example, a small number of workers sitting at 
well-spaced desks in an office might come into less contact with others than workers in a 
small garden centre who regularly come into contact with customers. 
This points to two other dimensions for the ease of social distancing at work. Consumer-
facing industries are likely to find social distancing measures more difficult to adopt than 
intermediate industries. And workplaces where physical teamwork is required will tend to 
have more social contact than those where workers are able to work individually on tasks 
most of the time. 
Figure 8. Occupation-level correlation between intensity of contact with team 
members and with customers 
 
Source: Figure 3 of Koren and Peto (2020). 
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Based on O*NET data for the US, Koren and Peto (2020) categorise occupations by the 
level of close contact that is required between workers, indicated by teamwork, and the 
need for face-to-face communication with customers. Figure 8 shows that these two 
indicators of the ease of social distancing are highly correlated. This suggests that there 
might be a fairly clear hierarchy of ability for social distancing in different roles.  
However, these categorisations are necessarily based on pre-pandemic data. A crucial 
issue is the extent to which firms and workers can innovate, changing work practices to 
reduce the risk of infection in the workplace. Notably, some of the riskiest professions in 
Koren and Peto’s taxonomy are considered key roles (such as healthcare, social work, 
psychiatry and teaching). We have already seen rapid innovation in each of these 
industries, as their workers have been asked to continue to work during the lockdown 
period.  
Encouraging firms to adapt to make social distancing easier 
After lockdown is eased, it seems inevitable that workplaces that are open will be asked to 
take measures to ensure social distancing. Doing this effectively will, in many cases, 
require considerable innovation, the nature of which will differ depending on the context.  
One of the most obvious innovations is to rearrange work to reduce the number of 
employees in the workplace. This can come partly through encouraging employees to 
work from home where possible (see Section 3), which will improve safety for those who 
must work on site. Another option is to change shift patterns. Figure 7 shows that the 
majority of workers are in their workplace during the traditional work hours of 9–5. 
Adapting the timing of work and shift patterns such that this is spread more evenly 
throughout the day could ease congestion in some workplaces.  
A second set of changes might be aimed at reducing contact between employees (and 
customers, where applicable) when they are on-site. Some types of face-to-face 
communication can be replaced by online meetings. Retail shops and restaurants that 
traditionally required close contact with customers have already shifted to click-and-
collect or take-away. New software has allowed pharmacists to easily transfer information 
between them, minimising the cost of workers working non-overlapping hours and 
requiring less face-to-face contact. Construction sites are assigning workers to a small, 
consistent team which alternates shifts with other teams. 
As even that short discussion helps illustrate, the appropriate innovations will be very 
idiosyncratic to the particular context in which they are applied. As such, it will be firms 
and industries that are best placed to work out how to innovate. But there may be market 
failures that prevent them from doing so, and the government has a key role in trying to 
mitigate them. 
First, there is uncertainty over how long social distancing will need to remain in place, 
meaning that firms cannot easily judge how much benefit they will see from innovation. It 
seems clear that, where workers cannot reasonably work from home, workplaces will be 
required to implement social distancing measures for some time after lockdown is eased. 
Being absolutely clear about that now, even without being quantitatively precise about the 
timeline, would probably help to mitigate some of the effects of uncertainty and ensure 
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that firms are not underinvesting in adaptations in the false hope that the end of 
lockdown means a return to normality. 
Second, there are positive externalities from safer workplaces, as consumers and workers’ 
wider networks of contacts will benefit from reduced infection transmission. Market forces 
may help: survey evidence suggests that consumer preferences are evolving to favour 
businesses with strong social distancing measures in place,2 and firms with stronger social 
distancing practices might find employees more willing to return to work and less likely to 
become sick. There may be a significant role for government in helping this along by 
signalling social (un)acceptability with its own statements on social distancing. But the 
positive externalities to such measures, and hence the potential for underinvestment, will 
remain. There is a case for the government to use other tools, such as fiscal subsidies, to 
more closely align the private and social returns. Regulation and monitoring of social 
distancing in the workplace would not only help directly ensure that firms do the socially 
desirable thing by reorganising work; it would also help spur the innovation needed to 
make that social distancing as compatible as possible with productivity. 
Finally, the government can assist by playing a central coordinating role in sharing 
examples of best practice of industry innovations, helping these to spread as quickly as 
possible. In fact, it may have something of a head start, since most of the public sector are 
‘key workers’ (compared with 22% of the workforce as a whole (Farquharson et al., 2020)), 
meaning that different parts of government have already gained experience in adopting 
innovations to bolster workplace safety during the pandemic. 
 
 
2  For example, a YouGov survey on 20–21 April found that the majority of consumers would ‘feel 
uncomfortable’ visiting premises such as restaurants, pubs and gyms once restrictions are loosened. 
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/health/articles-reports/2020/04/22/dont-count-customers-returning-once-covid-
19-lockd 
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6. Constraints making it difficult or 
undesirable for some workers to 
return to work 
There is likely to be a substantial asymmetry between entering and exiting the lockdown. 
Compliance with lockdown restrictions was high and almost immediate, with Google 
mobility data showing retail and recreation locations receiving almost 80% less traffic than 
pre-social distancing (Google, 2020). It is not clear how people will respond to an easing of 
restrictions. 
The likely consequences of infection differ widely across individuals, as do other costs of 
returning to work. Even if the risk of infection in the workplace can be reduced, some 
people may be unwilling to return to work if they or someone they are in contact with is at 
greater risk from the virus. Others will face other barriers such as caring responsibilities, 
especially while school and childcare closures remain in place.  
In addition, from society’s point of view, there can be greater risks from certain individuals 
commuting and spending time in the workplace, which may or may not coincide with the 
risks that are salient to individuals themselves. For example, if someone married to a key 
worker goes to work, gets infected and passes the virus to their spouse, there is an 
additional cost to society from the fact that a key worker may now be absent from work 
and that, as someone who tends to have greater-than-average social contact, they may 
spread the virus further. A similar argument may apply to parents in the scenario where 
schools and childcare settings reopen, since this could spread the virus indirectly through 
their children, though the importance of this infection channel is unknown.3 
To give a sense of scale for how important these risks or constraints to commuting and/or 
working on-site could be, we focus on the group of workers who are the most plausible 
candidates for the next stage of loosening lockdown restrictions: those who are not key 
workers (since they are already working) and who cannot easily work from home. Figure 9 
shows the prevalence of different risks or constraints among this group. Two-thirds of 
them have at least one flag associated with elevated risks or constraints (though note 
that, of course, these are only statistical proxies; actual risks will differ according to lots of 
unobservable factors, including genetics): being aged 60+, living with someone who is 60+, 
living with a key worker, or having pre-school or school-age children. About a sixth have 
one of the age-related flags, another sixth live with a key worker, and another third have a 
school-age or pre-school child. 
 
 
3  Our understanding is that the extent to which children could transmit the virus is an active area of research 
for the scientific community: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-52180783. 
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Figure 9. Constraints on working outside the home among non-key workers whose 
jobs do not typically allow home working: by age 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using UK Labour Force Survey (2018Q4–2019Q3). Classification of ability to work 
from home based on Dingel and Neiman (2020). Key workers are identified based on the methodology used in 
Farquharson et al. (2020). This graph builds up who faces constraints to working. Workers will be counted in the 
left-most category that applies to them, i.e. there is no double-counting. The sample is all non-key workers who 
are in occupations where fewer than a third of workers are predicted to be able to work from home (pre-crisis). 
One of the reasons why so many workers have elevated risks or constraints is that there is 
relatively little overlap between them, as Figure 9 shows. Older workers will tend to have 
greater health vulnerability, and the age groups below them tend to have children. There 
are, however, some groups who appear to have lower overall prevalence of risks or 
constraints than others. These include the youngest workers, as Figure 9 shows, and – to a 
lesser extent – those in London, as Figure 10 shows. It is worth recalling the evidence 
shown and discussed in Section 2, which suggests that the youngest workers are 
disproportionately likely to be furloughed and to be in sectors that have been shut down – 
many of which, such as hospitality, are unlikely to be allowed back in full very soon. This 
suggests that policy to support the matching of workers to (perhaps temporary) new 
roles, and to remove barriers that stop this (such as exclusivity clauses imposed by 
furloughing firms), could be particularly important for this group, and particularly relevant 
to any exit strategy that involves letting young workers out to work first. 
Figure 10. Constraints on working outside the home among non-key workers whose 
jobs do not typically allow home working: by location of residence 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using UK Labour Force Survey (2018Q4–2019Q3). Classification of ability to work 
from home based on Dingel and Neiman (2020). Key workers are identified based on the methodology used in 
Farquharson et al. (2020). This graph builds up who faces constraints to working. Workers will be counted in the 
left-most category that applies to them, i.e. there is no double-counting. The sample is all non-key workers who 
are in occupations where fewer than a third of workers are predicted to be able to work from home (pre-crisis). 
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7. What jobs will be available? 
Many jobs will not be available again immediately, or perhaps ever. Demand for some 
goods and services, most notably hospitality, tourism and travel, will remain low for some 
time, and innovations to how work is organised may permanently reduce demand for 
certain occupations (while increasing demand for others). In the month starting on 25 
March, job vacancies on the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) Find a Job website 
fell by over 65% compared with the levels registered for the same period one year earlier. 
Monitoring vacancies and how they match with the skill sets of the pool of furloughed or 
unemployed workers in each local labour market can help to inform policymakers on 
where skills are in short supply and on where it looks hard to find productive work for the 
unemployed without retraining or other measures. The effects of the crisis will be unequal 
across areas and difficult to precisely predict, making it likely that area-based policy will 
need to be responsive as information comes in (Overman, 2020) and that the quality of 
that information will be key. It is, of course, already obvious that some sectors are facing 
huge demands while others have been unable to operate. In order to provide essential 
services during the lockdown while keeping the economy ready for a smooth restart once 
restrictions are eased, policy will need to balance the need to reallocate employment to 
essential activities in the short term and maintaining workers’ attachment to their 
previous employers in the longer term if that employer–employee match has a viable 
long-term future (Costa Dias et al., 2020): this is the balance between preserving the 
aggregate stock of firm-specific human capital, and avoiding long-lasting mismatch in the 
labour market which would take a long time to unwind (Fujita et al., 2020).That may be a 
difficult trick to pull off, but there are some obvious things that the government could do, 
such as prohibiting furloughing firms from inserting exclusivity clauses into their workers’ 
contracts which prevent them from taking up other work while furloughed. 
Given the amount of labour market disruption taking place, even with highly successful 
labour market policies it is likely that there will be areas where the unemployed find it 
difficult to find jobs appropriate to their skills, at least in the short term. In such cases, it 
could be a good time for the government to consider public investments that would 
employ these people in the interim to do productive work that will pay off later, such as 
improving national infrastructure. The opportunity cost of doing this will be unusually low, 
if it can indeed be well targeted at areas where private sector vacancies are not providing 
opportunities well matched to people’s skill sets. Given the benefits from well-planned 
and coordinated public investments – rather than rushed ones – the government would 
be well advised to be on the front foot in thinking about any such measures now. 
It is not just jobs that we want, but good jobs (see Acemoglu (2019)). Productivity concerns 
are important. As Figure 11 shows, the UK performed very poorly in terms of productivity 
growth coming out of the last recession, for a number of reasons. We were already in a 
challenging situation, and we want to avoid it getting even worse after this crisis. 
The government will face a lot of lobbying by firms and industries. Ideally, it would like to 
promote work (and growth) in industries that will grow in future, and not use resources to 
protect declining industries. To some extent, the situation before the crisis tells us about 
the viability of certain industries. Some industries will not come back to where they were 
pre-crisis. High-street retail was already in decline (see, for example, the decline in retail 
employment depicted in figure 1 of Slaughter and Bell (2020)), while a shake-out of the 
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airline industry had already looked likely – and demand for air travel may well be reduced 
for some time, perhaps even permanently. 
Figure 11. Labour productivity before and after the financial crisis in the UK and 
other major economies 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from EU KLEMS database. 
Figure 12. Effect on UK GVA of increasing the labour force in that industry by 1% for 
the 10 private sector industries with the largest impacts 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using 2015 ONS input–output analytical tables following Fadinger and Schymik 
(2020).  
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Workers in different industries also differ in their potential contribution to the overall 
economy. Figure 12 shows the potential contribution of workers in different industries to 
UK gross value added (GVA) using a simple input–output model following Fadinger and 
Schymik (2020).4 This measure reflects three factors: the value added of the industry, each 
industry’s labour intensity, and the amount this industry supplies to other industries (and 
the amount these industries in turn supply to others, and so on).  
We take input–output coefficients from ONS’s input–output tables for 2015. It is very 
possible that input–output coefficients may have changed in response to the crisis. For 
example, restaurants that are still operating will likely make more use of delivery drivers. 
However, this gives us an illustrative indication of the relative importance of different 
sectors to gross value added – and an example of how to think about the issue. 
Figure 12 plots this measure for the top 10 private sector industries in terms of 
contribution to GVA. A given proportional increase in the number of workers in 
construction would have the largest impact on UK GVA, owing to the industry’s large size, 
labour intensity and importance in supplying inputs to downstream industries. Other 
industries whose workforce is important are retail, wholesale, financial services, 
restaurants, computer programming and land transport.  
 
 
4  Goods and services in each industry are produced by a representative firm using Cobb–Douglas technology, 
constant returns to scale and constant capital inputs. Given these assumptions, the effect on total UK GVA of 
increasing labour input in a given sector by 1% is 𝛽(𝐼 − Γ′)−1𝛼𝑖, where Γ is the input–output coefficient matrix 
with element 𝛾𝑖𝑗 being the value of inputs from industry i used to produce a unit of output in industry j, 𝛽 is a 
vector of value added shares in total UK GVA for different industries, and 𝛼𝑖 is a vector with the labour share 
of industry i in row i and all other entries 0. 
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8. Conclusion  
The government faces very difficult trade-offs in deciding when and how to ease lockdown 
restrictions to get people back into work. There is large uncertainty and limited knowledge 
about how things will evolve. We have discussed some key economic issues. Most notably, 
the government can help to reduce uncertainty by providing clear statements about policy 
in those areas where it can be confident of the broad direction of its impact and by 
providing insurance where possible. Enormous change and innovation is required by firms 
and workers, and certainty will help create the incentives to invest in that change. There 
are numerous market failures related to externalities, co-ordination and information. 
Policy can help to address these and we have discussed many specific kinds of policy 
instruments that could be well suited to doing so. Better data and the advice of the social 
science community on how these instruments can best be targeted, designed and 
implemented will help to make better policy. 
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